Michigan Law Review
Volume 49

Issue 5

1951

NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF HOSPITAL FOR SUICIDE OF PATIENT
Richard Darger
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard Darger, NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF HOSPITAL FOR SUICIDE OF PATIENT, 49 MICH. L. REV. 766
(1951).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol49/iss5/13

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

766

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 49

.
.
NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF HosPITAL FOR SmcmE OF PAUENT-Decedent, a
patient in the advanced stages of labor awaiting transfer from the labor room to
the delivery room of defendant hospital, opened a window, unhooked the screen
and jumped or fell to her death below. It was assumed by the court that death
was caused by intrapartum psychosis, a condition which plaintiff claimed was
recognized by the medical profession as a hazard of childbirth. Decedent had
exhibited no unusual symptoms and had previously been through two normal
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pregnancies. The jury was allowed to find defendant negligent in not providing
for constant attendance and in failing to bar the window of the labor room. Judgment for the plaintiff in the trial' court was reversed by the appellate division.
On appeal by the plaintiff to the Court of Appeals, held, reversed, two judges
dissenting. Santos v. Unity Hospital, 301 N.Y. 153, 93 N.E. (2d) 574 (1950).
The general duty of a hospital is to provide such care and attention for the
safety of the patient as his mental and physical condition may reasonably require.1 In determining whether this obligation has been fulfilled, the usual view
is that no one is required to guard against a hazard which a reasonable man under
the circumstances would not anticipate as likely to happen. 2 Thus it is held that
those in charge of a patient are not required to anticipate that he will jump or
fall through a window unless they have knowledge of language or conduct by
the patient that should lead them to realize that the patient is in danger from his
own actions. 3 Sometimes the anticipated danger is from intentional self injury.4
At other times in jury caused by an attempt to flee from some supposed danger
may be foreseen.:; Sometimes danger can be foreseen in allowing unrestricted
movement when the patient is not possessed of all his protective faculties. 6 These
cases should b~ distinguished in order to determine whether the hospital in a
particular case should be held liable for negligence. Delirium may be a sufficient
warning that special care should be used to prevent an accidental injury to the
patient7 but it is usually held to be insufficient to charge a hospital with notice
of a suicidal mania or an irrational fear which may cause an attempt to escape
through a window. 8 Violence, when accompanying delirium, has been held
sufficient notice to call for special protection from intentional self injury9 though
there is authority to the contrary.10 Not,vithstanding the lack of complete accord
as to what constitutes sufficient notice to require special care, all the cases seem
to agree that to find negligence there must be some evidence which would lead
the hospital to realize that this very patient is in danger from his own actions.
In the principal case the patient apparently was normal and healthy and had
1 Wetzel v. Omaha Maternity Hospital, 96 Neb. 636, 148 N.W. 582 (1914). For a
general discussion of the liability of hospitals for improper care of patients, see 22 A.L.R.
341 (1923), 39 A.L.R. 1431 (1925), 124 A.L.R. 186 (1940).
2 Fetzer v. Aberdeen Clinic, 48 S.D. 308, 204 N.W. 364 (1925).
3 Wood v. Samaritan Institution, 26 Cal. (2d) 847, 156 P. (2d) 470 (1945); Hawthorne v. Blythewood, 118 Conn. 617, 174 A. 81 (1934).
4 Daley v. State, 187 Misc. 99, 64 N.Y.S. (2d) 32 (1946); Tate v. McCall HoSPital,
57 Ga. App. 824, 196 S.E. 906 (1938).
5Robertson v. Charles B. Towns HoSPital, 178 App. Div. 285, 165 N.Y.S. 17 (1917);
Emory University v. Shadburn, 47 Ga. App. 643, 171 S.E. 192 (1933).
6 Durfee v. Dorr, 131 Ark. 369, 199 S.W. 376 (1917); Davis v. Springfield Ho5Pital,
(Mo. App. 1917) 196 S.W. 104, (on retrial) (Mo. App. 1920) 218 S.W. 696.
7 Supra note 6.
s Breeze v. St. Louis & ·s.F. Ry., 264 Mo. 258, 174 S.W. 409 (1915); Fetzer v. Aberdeen Clinic, supra note 2; Wood v. Samaritan Institution, supra note 3; Davis v. Springfield, supra note 6. Contra, Wetzel v. Omaha Maternity HOSPital, supra note I.
9 Spivey v. St. Thomas HOSPital, 31 Tenn. App. 12, 211 S.W. (2d) 450 (1947);
Wood v. Samaritan Institution, supra note 3.
10 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Cash's Administrator, 221 Ky. 655, 299 S.W. 590 (1927).
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twice before experienced this type of situation without unusual difficulty. There
was evidence to show that :intrapartum psychosis is an exceedingly rare affiiction.11 Furthermore, there does not appear to have been any evidence that deceased had an intrapartum psychosis beyond the fact that she was in labor.
It is submitted that in the light of the prior decisions in this field, the evidence
as a whole was insufficient to warrant the jury in finding the hospital negligent,
either in not providing constant attendance for this patient or in not barring the
window of the labor room.
Richard Darger

11

Principal case at 576.

